Introduction

G
ATHERING data on quantitative measurements of the drift of sea ice and ocean currents has long been an objective of oceanographic observation and study. Although ice movements in the Baffin Bay -Eastern Arctic system, as a reflection of winds and surface currents, are generally known, they are little understood. Knowledge of the seasonal pattern of the occurrence of sea ice has been built up over a long period and added to in recent years through the Canadian, United States, and Danish ice observing programs. Quantitative aspects of drift however are obscured by the growth of new ice and the disintegration of old ice.
For quantitative data on ice drift, an identifiable object is required. Such objects may be a ship beset by ice, a camp on the ice, or a marker of some sort. Individual pieces of sea ice, however distinctive, cannot safely be used except over the shortest periods and under continuous surveillance. Distinctive icebergs are possible markers and have recently been used by the International Ice Patrol (Lenczyk 1965) . Specific marking of floes or icebergs has not been extensively used because of the lack of development of practical methods and the large commitment for surveillance.
The recorded ship drifts of the last century ( an ice floe from Smith Sound to the coast of Labrador, a total distance of some 1,600 miles, was previously the longest documented drift (Davis 1876; Tyson 1874) . These drifts, summarized and discussed by Dunbar (1962) , suggested that winter movements from the Northern Baffin Bay area to the waters south of Davis Strait and even to Labrador was possible (Fig. 1) . More recently the Russian Ice Station NP-7, abandoned north of Greenland in latitude 85"N. on 11 April 1959, was two years later found off the coast of Baffin Island in latitude 70'28'N. on 9 April 1961. That it reached this point via Nares Strait has been concluded independently by Gudkovich and Balakshin (1962) and by Dunbar (1962) .
Winter drift of icebergs from northern Baffin Bay to the waters of Labrador and Newfoundland has been established by the International Ice Patrol, upon whose background and experience we must draw in the interpretation of the drift of Ice Island WH-5. This Patrol is conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard and hereafter is referred to in the text as the Ice Patrol. Its mission is to protect North Atlantic shipping from the hazards of icebergs which in varying numbers drift into the shipping lanes off Newfoundland each spring, and in carrying out this mission it has an obvious interest in the supply of icebergs to the north and the factors influencing their drift. Since its foundation, the Ice Patrol has accumulated extensive practical experience in interpreting iceberg drift, and the present assessment of the iceberg problem is summarized by Lenczyk (1965) .
The points which have specific bearing on the interpretation of the drift of WH-5 are:
1. The 
2.
Winds would seem to exercise the primary control in determining to what extent the iceberg supply will reach the Grand Banks. Records have demonstrated a close correlation between the winter wind patterns and the severity of the iceberg season. Under normal winter conditions, when there is a favourable air flow as shown by mean,monthly maps of surface pressure, the average rate of drift from Baffin Bay to the Grand Banks appears to be approximately 8 to 9 miles per day. With the coming of late spring and early summer this pattern breaks down with the advent of neutral or unfavourable winds which may slow or halt the drift. Onshore winds will drive many bergs into the coastal waters where they may become trapped in the bays or go aground. A period of offshore winds may drive bergs to seaward out of the Currents.
3.
Pack ice plays an important role in the protection and preservation of icebergs. Bergs that are located between Cape Chidley and Cape Dyer during the preceding autumn are most likely to reach the farthest south while still remaining within the pack ice and associated cold water. Once bergs escape from the pack ice into open water, disintegration takes place quite rapidly. Thus bergs arriving off Labrador in June and July when the pack ice has retreated have little chance of reaching the Grand Banks, and are no more than a threat to local shipping in the waters of northern Newfoundland and Labrador.
In the immediate postwar years 'ice islands' that apparently calved from the 248 In a preliminary report by Nutt and Coachman (1963) the movements of WH-5 up to the summer of 1963 were summarized, and information on the radio beacons installed on two of the pieces was presented. The purpose of this paper is to present in summary the final documentation of the drift of Ice Island WH-5 from the time of its calving from the Ward Hunt Ice Shelf during the winter of 1961-62 until the final sightings of the remaining fragments in the waters of Labrador and Newfoundland during the summer of 1964, and to discuss the oceanographic implications. The documentation of the drift is based on visual sightings from ships and aircraft and from aerial radar photography. Unless otherwise indicated, all dimensions and distances are given in nautical miles. The drift will be considered and discussed in three phases:
1. Labrador and Newfoundland.
Ward Hunt Ice Shelf to Kennedy Channel
The actual time or cause of the massive calving is not precisely known. It occurred during the winter of 1961-62 when the entire northern part of the Ward Hunt Ice Shelf, some 200 square miles in area, broke off as five major pieces. Four of these drifted to the westward in the Arctic Ocean whereas one, the largest, with dimensions of about 11 x 5 miles and identified as drifted to the eastward (Hattersley-Smith, 1962) . During the summer and autumn of 1962 WH-5 was observed on five occasions, two visually during June and July by Canadian investigators and three during the autumn by radar photography of the U.S. Navy Birdseye flights, a periodic ice reconnaissance mission conducted by the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office. The best estimate of these positions is given in Fig. 3 . Around 1946 there was a calving of a 1.5 x 4 mile segment of Smith (1931) , Schule and Wittmann (1958) , Simpson (1958) , and Kupetskiy (1962) , that the regular open North Water in northern Baffin Bay is caused by the removal of any ice which forms south of the usual sea-ice bridge across Smith Sound, through action of the southward flowing current and prevailing north and northeast winds.
Kennedy Channel to Escape from Smith Sound
On 14 July WH-5 was observed from a Birdseye flight and photographs were obtained. These revealed a loosing of the ice to the north with fine leads of open water. This may have been the beginning of the dramatic breakout during the following 10 days. The next reconnaissance, in which the author participated, was made on 24 July by the US. Air Force. WH-5, still one piece, had moved away from the western side of the channel and was located east of Hans Island and north of Franklin Island, with its axis parallel to that of the channel and the reentrant end to the north (see Fig. 3 for this and subsequent positions in this area). Fig. 7 shows the last photograph of WH-5 as a single piece. Neitper the end that had lain against Hans Island, nor the reentrant end had changed substantially. It therefore would seem reasonably conclusive that the breakout must have taken place first with a dramatic movement northward to free the Ice Island, followed by movement to the eastward with clockwise rotation, and then movement to the south, eastward of Hans Island. Furthermore, by 24 July there was again a rapid new southerly movement of water in Kennedy Channel particularly on the western side where forerunners of the pack ice which had been released were observed more than 30 miles south of the former ice dam.
Observations from a special U.S. Navy reconnaissance flight on 26 and 27 JuIy showed that WH-5 had moved southwestward between Hans and Franklin islands and had broken into 3 major pieces and many small fragments. (Fig. 4) .
During the remainder of the summer and early fall piece C was not reported again, having evidently escaped to the southward. Pieces A and B must have drifted slowly and aimlessly north and west and separated, with piece B taking a more southerly route. On 14 and 15 September the C.C.G.S. Labrador reported that piece B lay to the south of Cape Sabine, whereas piece A was located south of Bache Peninsula. A further report from the U.S. Air Force and from the C.C.G.S. Labrador on 20 and 21 September indicated that each piece had moved only a few miles to the eastward (Fig. 4) . Where orientation of the pieces was not determined, the positions are indicated by a circle only.
Then a dramatic southward movement started. Piece B must have escaped southward first. It was never sighted again although its radio beacon was picked up on several subsequent occasions. A helicopter flight from the U.S.S. Edisto on 24 September located piece A close off and just north of Cape Isabella, Ellesmere Island, and the final landing for the season was made at the radio beacon site (Fig. 4) . From off Bache Peninsula it had drifted southward a distance of 40 miles at an average rate of 10 miles per day. The U.S.C.G.C. Westwind stood by piece A until 27 September in an attempt to refit the radio beacons for over winter operation, but a strong northerly wind, at times reaching gale force, forestalled this attempt and with little doubt was the cause of the rapid escape of the WH-5 pieces from Kane Basin and Smith Sound. 
DISCUSSION
The behaviour of the Ice Island WH-5 from the time of its breakout and breakup in Kennedy Channel until its escape southward from Smith Sound casts some light on the nature of the water exchange between the Arctic Ocean and Baffin Bay through Nares Strait. Discussion is limited to the specific implications of the drift of WH-5, and not an overall consideration of the oceanography of the area. All recent analyses of the water balance of the Arctic Ocean (for example, Treshnikov 1959 , Timofeyev 1960 , Vowinkel and Orvig 1961 , and Mosby 1962 require a net transport of water from the Arctic Ocean southward through the Canadian Channels to Baffin Bay. This would seem to be supported in Nares Strait by the well-established drift and escape southward of sea ice. Actual dynamic calculations of transport have been made from seven sections in Smith Sound. A section from the Godthaab cruise of 1928 (Killerich 1939 ) and 5 sections from the Labrador cruises of , and 1964 (Collin 1965 ) all showed that a flow to the south was taking place; while a single section from the Labrador cruise of 1954 (Bailey 1957) indicated that a flow to the north was in progress at that time.
The behaviour of WH-5, with its pieces and fragments providing conclusively identifiable drift markers that had originated from a single source, extends our knowledge of this exchange. As suggested by Bailey's single section in 1954, southward transport does not appear to be a continuous process. In 1963 the movements of WH-5 clearly demonstrated intervals of distinct northward transport or of virtually no transport. Its positional stability, while blocking Kennedy Channel from February to July, would suggest a continuous southerly flow over this period. But the breakout as described required a northerly surge after 14 July to loosen the Ice Island and the ice packed to the north of it. By 24 July a rapid southerly transport had been re-established. Then this southerly movement ceased between 5 and 10 August, and a rather general northerly movement was established in Smith Sound and southern Kane Basin. There appears to be no clear explanation for the separation of piece C from piece A, or for the virtual joining of pieces A and B between 5 and 13 August. This must have resulted from uncertain local eddies and local winds.
The slow northward and westward movement of pieces A and B suggested development of a sluggish counterclockwise gyre in Kane Basin from 10 August to 20 September. Southerly transport seemed to have taken place intermittently on the western side, while on the eastern side, especially in Peabody Bay, movements were sluggish as the ice, although broken up, remained there while central and west Kane Basin emptied. After 20 September rapid southerly movement was again restored under the influence of strong northerly winds. It is possible that these periods of northerly transport are seasonal and limited to the summer.
The general counterclockwise circulation in the very northern part of Baffin Bay (Killerich 1939; Dunbar 1951) together with the indicated counterclockwise gyre and intermittent periods of northward transport in Kane Basin appear to make Smith Sound an area of very irregular currents and eddies. Such vagaries undoubtedly contributed to the separation of the three major pieces and fragments and had a far-reaching effect on their winter drift south in the Baffin and Labrador Current systems.
Northern Baffin Bay to Labrador and Newfoundland
At the end of September the best estimate of the positions of the principal pieces of WH-5 was as follows: Piece C was possibly as far south as Lancaster Sound; piece A was off southern Ellesmere Island in Latitude 77"30'N., with B presumably somewhere in between, but probably nearer to A. It Labrador and Baffin Currents as far north as Cape Dyer, Baffin Island, in latitude 67'37'N. The visibility was good, but since no Ice Island pieces were seen, they were presumed to have been to the north. Thus at the beginning of December it is quite likely that many of the pieces and fragments were within the area of some 340 miles of Baffin Current which had escaped surveillance.
On 25 January 1964 the Birdseye flight reported that "a possible radar contact was made with WH-5 at 67'30'N." off Cape Dyer, Baffin Island. This most likely was a reference to piece A which, because of its size, would offer the best target for a single identification within the pack ice.
From 26 to 28 February 1964 the Ice Patrol definitely located two groups of Ice Island pieces. One group of approximately 16 pieces averaging 800 x 400 feet was located off Hamilton Inlet in Latitude 54"30'N., and was at the time presumed to be fragments of piece C (supported by later observations). Four or 5 fragments were scattered 150 miles to the northwest. The second group, composed of 8 larger fragments averaging about 1,500 x 700 feet and rather close together, was located off Cape Chidley, Labrador, in latitude 61'15'N. These must have been fragments of either piece A or piece B.
The Birdseye flight on 2 April 1964 reported, "Numerous fragments of Ward Hunt 5 were sighted along the Labrador Coast. None of these fragments was of significant size." On 19 May the Ice Patrol observed near Notre Dame Bay, Newfoundland in latitude 50"N., several fragments, considered by Lenczyk (1965) to have been from among those sighted earlier on 26 and 28 February off Cape Chidley.
In the spring and summer, positive identifications were made of remnants of the three original major pieces. Beginning in the south we have:
Piece C: As reported by Lenczyk (1965) ice-island fragments were sighted by the Ice Patrol in early April lying just to the north of the Grand Banks, and these were considered to be the remnants of the 16 ice-island fragments sighted off Hamilton Inlet on 26 and 28 February. By late April an estimated 50 fragments were in the vicinity of the Grand Banks in latitude 46"N., longitude 51"W., and in early May a few leaders had reached latitude 44"N. That these must have been portions of major piece C is confirmed by subsequent identification in late June of the remnants of pieces A and B farther north along the Labrador Coast. Piece A: A segment of WH-5 whose horizontal dimensions were 1.5 x 3.5 miles was observed by a U.S. Navy ice reconnaissance flight on 27 June some 25 miles off the Labrador Coast, in latitude 57"lO'N. From its size we may safely conclude that it is the remaining major segment of piece A.
The Ice Patrol reported that once the fragments of piece C escaped the pack ice off Newfoundland to open water, they rapidly disintegrated, surviving only 10 to 20 days. Therefore, after the above sightings and identifications of the remnants of the major pieces, all in open water, their life was limited. Piece C had disintegrated on the Grand Banks by the end of May. Ice Island fragments were seen by the Ice Patrol off Hamilton Inlet in July, with a final sighting of a fragment from the disintegration area on 11 August off Belle Isle. has been considered to be the only source of the reported ice-island pieces and fragments. It is, however, a possibility that random pieces of other ice islands such as T-1, then breaking up in Parry Channel, might have found their way through the Canadian islands into Baffin Bay concurrently with the WH-5 pieces; and in particular the report of 2 ice-island pieces from Baffin Bay in October 1964 could possibly have been from a source other than WH-5. However, it is overwhelmingly clear that most of the WH-5 pieces did enter the Baffin Current during the summer and autumn of 1963; and it is doubtful that any other major contribution from another ice-island in the Canadian Channels could have been made without being detected.
All reports that have been recognized: 8 large pieces off Cape Chidley, 16 off Hamilton Inlet, and 50 or more fragments on the Grand Banks, must have come from 
DISCUSSION
The drift of Ice Island WH-5 from northern Baffin Bay to the coast of Labrador and Newfoundland is a demonstration of the net surface movements of the Baffin and Labrador Current systems, and reveals something of their nature. The major pieces and the many fragments represent essentially a single source of identifiable drift markers released in Kennedy Channel. Eventually all or in any case the majority of these drift markers escaped south into the Baffin and Labrador Currents. Most remarkable is the very wide variation in times of arrival in the southern waters and the very great scattering of the pieces in the course of their drift. The first forerunners from piece C were observed off Hamilton Inlet in late February, while the last stragglers from A or B were appearing there well into July, nearly 5 months later. Maximum scattering occurred during early May when Ice Islands remnants were stretched out from Latitude 44" on the Grand Banks to the vicinity of Cape Chidley, Labrador (or even further north), a distance of some 1,100 miles (Fig. 5) .
Although concentrated within a comparatively small area in Smith Sound and southern Kane Basin i n early August, the pieces and fragments later escaped southward irregularly over a period of approximately one month from late August to late September, which must reflect the local vagaries in this area during the period of weak northerly transport and the development of the counterclockwise gyre in Kane Basin. It is particularly remarkable how piece C, less than 5 miles from piece A on 6 August, escaped approximately a month earlier. This, and the irregular movements of pieces A and B, serve to emphasize the uncertain surface water movements which existed in Smith Sound and southern Kane Basin at that time (Fig. 4) .
After its escape from Smith Sound the rapid and great southward movement of piece C is significant in demonstrating the importance of timing and location of entry to the Baffin Current as proposed by Lenczyk (1965) . Piece C or its fragments must have been close to the north of Cape Dyer at the time of the reconnaissance on 4 and 5 December, and have joined with the bergs in the primary threat area between Cape Dyer and Cape Chidley. From here piece C was transported far south to the Grand Banks under the favourable wind circulation prevailing during the winter and early spring of 1964, while still remaining protected within the pack ice limits.
The somewhat later escape of pieces A and B from Smith Sound resulted in quite a different pattern of drift. They were late enough to lie only in the area of secondary threat north of Cape Dyer, thus drifting south initially at slower rates than piece C, and subsequently slowing even more off the Labrador coast with the diminishing favourable winds in early spring. Escape from the pack ice off Labrador in June led to their final disintegration there and in the waters or northern Newfoundland.
The drift of the Cape Chidley pieces to off Notre Dame Bay from February to May at a rate of 9.3 miles per day is near the normal established by the Ice Patrol, and reflects the generally favourable wind conditions during that period.
That the fragment of piece B, positively identified by the drum and flag, was found well inshore and isolated, may have provided us with an anomalous record. This individual piece may have wandered inshore out of the main stream and become slowed or stopped in the coastal waters, while other fragments of piece B continued to drift south. It would seem in fact that the Cape Chidley and Notre Dame Bay pieces were more likely to have been the main body of piece B. It thus appears that the initial scattering took place because of the irregular escape of the ice island pieces from Smith Sound and entry into the Baffin Current. The local vagaries of the Baffin and Labrador Current systems then resulted in further extensive scattering during the transit from northern Baffin Bay to the disintegration areas off Labrador and Newfoundland.
